Internet is one of the favorite weapons of Daech … but who provides it? – Télérama.fr

According to “Der Spiegel”, the terrorists pass through European satellites, the French Eutelsat. But selling their connections

Interviewed by Jean-Jacques Bourdin Wednesday on BFMTV-RMC, Manuel Valls reiterated that now holds the government mantra: “The Internet is a freedom, is an amazing way to communicate with people, that’s a plus for the economy, but it is also a way for terrorists to communicate and spread their totalitarian ideology” . And if the organization has colonized Islamic state social networks to recruit jihadists apprentices with a lot of incendiary videos, it also has its own infrastructure within the Caliphate, straddling Syria and Iraq. Yet a desert territory and cut off from the world, where telecommunications facilities were destroyed by four years of civil war. But how do they do?

In a survey released late last week, Der Spiegel shows that the terrorist group is connected to the network through satellite connections. Citing several local sources, the German magazine said that fighters Daech go to Antioch, “Crown of the East”, south-west Turkey, a few dozen kilometers from the Syrian border. There, in that open and porous zone, they can stock up on clothes as electronic equipment.

$ 500 for an antenna

According to the magazine German, middle men with pockets full of bundles come to their market on behalf of the terrorist organization (it takes about $ 500 for an antenna and a modem). Daech by authorized technicians will then install the equipment load in Internet cafes controlled by the organization or home emirs. According to GPS data obtained by the Spiegel, several terminals have been located in Raqqa, the “capital” of the Caliphate, but also in Aleppo, the second city of Syria, or Mosul, Iraq. Problem: the jihadists should not be able to technically enable

Unlike the fiber or ADSL, satellite Internet remains a niche market, makes little known operators. consumer and intermediate suppliers. Above all, it is based on a compact and mobile equipment, difficult to draw, even as the network coverage areas are particularly extensive. Under these conditions, how to prevent an individual to cross the Turkish-Syrian border with an antenna under your arm? This is not enough, fighters Daech necessarily benefit from the subscription that accompanies the terminal. This is where things get tricky: the jihadists would connect to satellites operated by European operators. Cited include the UK Avanti PLC, the Luxembourg SES and Eutelsat French, 26% owned by the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (ie the State).

Partners in Turkey

Are they aware? Contacted by Télérama , the direction of Eutelsat Communications said that the “has no direct contact with the end user,” , and merely signing contracts with local partners, who order and market terminals. “Since 2013, we remind our suppliers that international sanctions against Syria forbid us to carry out business activities there” , she says again. If the company has no presence on the territory of Daech, its satellites cover the area and most importantly, it confirmed having established trade agreements with several Turkish ISPs, under the control of the Bilgi ve Iletisim Teknolojileri Kurumu (BTK) The local telecoms authority. In these circumstances, no question of taking responsibility for a infréquentable connectivity: “We have not any evidence which shows that our equipment is used by the organization Islamic state. Did you ask how many of his Toyota pick-ups are in circulation in Syria and Iraq? “

Same story on the side of SES, where a representative will also be his analogy: ” This is like saying that the Bataclan terrorists were equipped by Orange. We merely rent capacity on our satellite fleet, we do not sell terminals, and we operate in B2B (business to business) . We sort our customers on the pane, and our contracts define a specific geographic area “. The Luxembourg company, working with a partner in Turkey, emphasizes the difficulty to act preventively. In the manner of a Twitter, which removes accounts when the jihadists are reported by the Internet, satellite operators must track down suspicious connections a posteriori (although a terminal automatically communicates its GPS location at the time of activation). “Once we have a doubt, we perform a thorough scan géolocalisant terminals, to block the IP address if necessary. For now, we have not identified. “ More than technical, the problem would it be political? If there are no suppliers in Syria or Iraq, does it mean that another regional partner fails to meet its contractual commitments basting the Islamic state? “This is what The conclusion “, according to a representative of SES.